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a.m. every morning to begin her twelve-hour shift at a textile
factory. 1 Along with other children, she toiled at least twelve
hours a day, seven days a week, and slept in a dilapidated,
poorly ventilated factory room with no heat in the frigid
winters. 2 One night in December 2004, Yajuan and her
roommates lit a small charcoal stove, only to be found dead
the next morning from inhaling charcoal fumes. 3 Yajuan’s
labor, alongside countless other young victims, fuel a multibillion dollar counterfeit industry every year. 4
Eduardo Arias of Panama City, Panama, was shopping
the aisles of a discount store when he spotted a tube of
toothpaste labeled with the word, “Colgate,” being sold at a
price so low that even street vendors purchased their
supplies from the chain. 5 But among the ingredients, where it
should have listed “glycerin,” Arias caught the chemical name
for antifreeze, 6 the same toxic substitute that had already
caused innumerable deaths in the country earlier in the year. 7
Within days, Mr. Arias lit the fuse that exposed a scandal of
counterfeit products that would reverberate throughout the
world. 8 The fake Colgate toothpaste Mr. Arias found would
eventually reach thirty-four countries, doled out to U.S.
prisoners and wealthy patrons at high-end hotels alike. 9
1. Jan
Goodwin,
The
Human
Cost
of
Fakes,
HARPER’S
BAZAAR, Jan. 1, 2006, at 54, available at http://www.jangoodwin.com/articles/
thehumancostoffakes.pdf.
2. Id.
3. See e.g., id. (In the morning, the factory owner ordered the girls’ bodies
be quickly sealed in coffins and sent them off for cremation. Later, an
investigation would reveal that at least two of the girls had still been alive when
they were entombed).
4. Jamie Corsi, For Companies, Counterfeit Battle is Never-Ending, CNBC
(Jul. 90, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/38125681 (“Watches, handbags,
footwear and medicine made up more than $260 million in counterfeit products
seized at US ports in 2009.”).
5. Walt Bogdanich, The Everyman Who Exposed Tainted Toothpaste,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/world/americas/
01panama.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
6. David Von Drehle, Eduardo Arias – Person of the Year 2007, People
Who Mattered, TIME (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/
personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1690758_1693575,00.html; see also
Bogdanich, supra note 5.
7. Laura C. Nastase, Made in China: How Chinese Counterfeits are
Creating a National Security Nightmare for the United States, 19 FORDHAM INT’L.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 150 (2008) (citing Bogdanich, supra note 5).
8. Von Drehle, supra note 6; see also Bogdanich, supra note 5.
9. Bogdanich, supra note 5.
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LeRoy Hubley of Toldeo, Ohio, watched his wife of fortyeight years pass away. 10 Mrs. Hubley had a kidney disease
that required dialysis, a disorder she also passed to her son. 11
For months, Mrs. Hubley used Heparin, a commonly
prescribed blood-thinner, not knowing that the batch she was
given was counterfeit—the active ingredient was switched
with a far cheaper substitute 12 that would poison her to death.
Within weeks, the Hubleys’ son suffered the same fate. 13
These three stories regarding trademark infringement,
alongside countless others that have come out of the
woodwork, 14 all originate from a common source: China, the
country that remains the single largest producer of counterfeit
goods in the world. 15 Just as China has become the world’s
leading exporter of manufactured goods, it is likewise
dominating the underground market for knock-offs. 16
The purpose of this Comment is to explore trademark
counterfeiting.
Part I will discuss what trademark
counterfeiting comprises of, the current laws in place, and the
impact the act leaves on companies in the United States. 17
Part II will examine why trademark counterfeiting occurs and
why, despite being the target of severe international scrutiny
and criticism for over a decade, there still appears to be little
evidence 18 of marked improvement. 19 Lastly, Part III will

10. Bill Powell, Heparin’s Deadly Side Effects, TIME (Nov. 13, 2008),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1858870-1,00.html; see also
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Says Drug Contamination May Have Been Deliberate,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/30/health/policy/30heparin.html.
11. See Powell supra note 10; see also Harris supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 1.
15. Dalila Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in China,

But an Understanding of China’s Culture Will: A Lesson the United States Has to
Learn, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 325, 326 (2011).
16. Andrew Yeh, The Complex Trade in Luxurious Fakes, FIN. TIMES OF ASIA
(Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/05eb362c-cef711da-925d-0000779e2340.html#axzz2CXW0cpUl.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic
of China, 78 WASH. U. L.R. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Chow, Counterfeiting in the
PRC]; Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy
Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 204 (2006) [hereinafter Chow, China Does
Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously].
19. See infra Part II.
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recommend strategies for ending China’s counterfeit crisis. 20
I. BACKGROUND

A. What is Counterfeiting?
Trademark counterfeiting has become increasingly
pervasive in international trade. 21 From 2004 to 2009, China
dominated in counterfeit production by a wide margin,
accounting for 77% of the aggregate value of goods seized in
the United States—with the next country in line accounting for
merely 7%. 22 China’s extensive history of corruption and its
ineffective enforcement of anti-counterfeiting in the field of
intellectual
property
have
certainly
been
heavily
In
particular,
Chinese
trademark
documented. 23
counterfeiting has been the target of intense scrutiny, from
U.S. Senators 24 to the chairman of Louis Vuitton, 25 who
bemoaned China as being an especially big headache. 26 In
August 2012, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported
that customs agents seized nearly 25,000 counterfeit goods
during fiscal year 2011, amounting to an estimated $1.1 billion
in lost sales. 27 In reality, the number of counterfeit products
20. See infra Part III.
21. THE U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM. CHAIRMAN’S STAFF, SEN. BOB CASEY,
CHAIRMAN, THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT ON THE ECONOMY 1 (Aug.
2012),
available
at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e38-7150a3bb62be
[hereinafter Congress Joint Economic Committee].
22. U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY:
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT
AND
PIRATED
GOODS
8
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303057.pdf.
23. Nastase, supra note 7, at 145; see also Donald P. Harris, The
Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 102 (2009).
24. Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong.
1–3 (2005) (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff.), available at https://bulk.resource.org/
gpo.gov/hearings/109s/21823.pdf [hereinafter Hearing].
25. See e.g., Yeh, supra note 16 (Bernard Arnault is the LVMH chairman and
also France’s richest man. LVMH includes the Louis Vuitton, Fendi, Givenchy,
Moët & Chandon, and Dom Perignon brands).
26. Id.
27. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21; see also CBP
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2011 SEIZURE STATISTICS (2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/iprcenter/pdf/ipr-fy-2011-seizure-report.pdf;
Sheryl
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that pass undetected is immeasurably higher because of the
impossibility to screen each imported shipment of goods. In
the port of Los Angeles alone, 14 million containers arrive
every year, but authorities are able to examine less than 1%
of those containers. 28 Overall, counterfeiting cost American
businesses $250 billion in lost revenue in 2011, 29 and while
trademark counterfeiting occurs worldwide, China accounts
for the vast majority of fake goods detained at the U.S.
border. 30
In this Comment, “counterfeiting” refers to the unlawful
act of one party in producing exact copies of merchandise
with trademarks owned by another party. 31 Counterfeiting
involves an effort to market fake merchandise as genuine by
creating a replicated product that appears to be
indistinguishable from the authentic product. 32 To do so,
counterfeiters use the same trade dress as the original
product on the knock-off and often even include on the
pirated goods the name and address of the manufacturer
whose product and trademark has been infringed upon. 33
Counterfeit products also raise product quality concerns and
pose consumer risks because the replicated goods are of
lower quality, yet the counterfeiter attempts to pass off the
product as genuine and originating from a well-known brand
name. 34

B. Current Laws in Place
In 1982, China adopted the Trademark Law, which was
devised to address many of the same concerns covered by
Harris,

You

Shop

‘Faux,
For

the

Faux
Faux.’
Holidays: Plain

Dodge
Dealing,

Counterfeits

As

CLEVELAND SUN.COM
(Nov. 17, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/consumeraffairs/index.ssf/
2012/11/dodging_counterfeits_as_you_sh.html.
28. Elizabeth Lee, Counterfeit Industry Tied to Organized Crime, Terrorism,
VOICE OF AM. (July 4, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/counterfeitindustry-tied-to-organized-crime-terrorism/1363590.html.
29. Greg Hardesty, Police Crack Down on Designer Deceit in O.C., ORANGE
CNTY. REG. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/news/counterfeit377983-agents-merchandise.html (citing the International Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition).
30. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21.
31. Chow, Counterfeiting in the PRC, supra note 18, at 449.
32. Id. at 450.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 450–51.
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the trademark law in the United States. 35
Under the
Trademark Law, a party may infringe by using a mark that is
the same or similar to another’s on the same or similar goods,
selling goods that bear another’s mark, or counterfeiting
Similar to the American doctrine of
another’s mark. 36
contributory infringement, providing storage or shipping
products for the purpose of infringement also incurs liability. 37
Then, when the amount of infringing sales involved is
“relatively large” or “huge,” infringers may face criminal
charges. 38
It would be fair to say that China’s existing framework for
trademark protection is viable because the Chinese
government has shown its commitment to trademark
protection through adopting both domestic laws and all major
international treaties. 39 In 1980, China became a contracting
party of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”),
a United Nations agency comprised of over 185 member
states dedicated to protecting intellectual property. 40 In 1985,
China became a member of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Intellectual Property (“Paris Convention”), and in
order to comply with the Convention’s requirements, passed
the 2001 Trademark Law and the 2003 Provisions on the
Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks. 41 In
1995, China joined the Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
(“Madrid Protocol”), an international system for registering
marks. 42 Lastly, in 2001, China became a member of the
World Trade Organization, signing the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 43 and amending
existing Chinese law to comply with Article 16 of the
35. Timothy Lau, Kyle Niemi & Lanna Wu, Note, Protecting Trademark Rights
in China Through Litigation, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 441, 442 (2011).
36. Id. at 443.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Hoover, supra note 15, at 337.
40. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.ORG., http://www.wipo.int/members/en/
(last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
41. Hoover, supra note 15, at 335–36.
42. Id. at 336.
43. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves
China’s
Accession
(Nov.
10,
2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/
pr252_e.htm.
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agreement. 44
By continually committing themselves to
conventions, treaties, and agreements, China demonstrates
its commitment to meeting international standards for
Moreover, China’s
protecting intellectual property. 45
participation in the international platform is particularly
important because under Chinese law, when a conflict arises
between Chinese domestic law and international standards,
the international rules will apply. 46
It is important to note, however, that having laws that
comply on paper with international standards means little
when enforcement of the laws is weak. 47 In the United States,
the incentive to copy is heavily offset by the criminal
sanctions that result if caught. 48 On the contrary, China has a
developing legal structure that is inadequate in enforcing
intellectual property rights. 49

C. Resulting Problems from Counterfeiting
1. Trademark Owner’s Rights Infringed
Innovation stimulates both economic growth and
employment opportunities, and at the core of ensuring that
individuals pursue such innovation is the assurance that their
intellectual property rights will be protected. 50 By contrast,
counterfeiting stunts economic growth and erodes the returns
on innovation because the negative impacts of potential theft
on businesses diminish the incentive to create. 51 Businesses
often experience lost revenue and eventually, lower profits
when sales from authentic goods are diverted to
counterfeits. 52 Profits are also negatively impacted by the
added costs required to defend the business from future
incidences
of
intellectual
property
infringement. 53
Additionally, the availability of a replicated good can put
44. Hoover, supra note 15, at 337.
45. Id.
46. Administrative Procedure Law (adopted Apr. 4,1989), art. 72 (China),
available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2695.
47. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 212.
48. Id. at 211–12.
49. Id. at 212.
50. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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downward pressure on the price of the authentic product,
causing further decline in revenue. 54
The proliferation of the Internet has significantly
enhanced the accessibility to counterfeit goods. 55
Furthermore, counterfeiting techniques have become so
developed and advanced that many fakes cannot be
distinguished from the real product by the naked eye. 56
Accessibility to counterfeits in conjunction with nearly perfect
replication skyrockets the likelihood of purchase and
consumer confusion. As a result, a company’s brand may be
damaged when consumers, unaware that they purchased a
counterfeit good, instead blame the maker of the genuine
product for the poor-quality counterfeit they have received. 57

2. Consumer Risks
Counterfeiting activity creates significant consumer
safety risks, a concern that affects not only the well-being of
individuals in the United States but the health and safety of
individuals throughout the world. Consumers are harmed
when they purchase counterfeit items of lower quality
because some goods, such as illegitimate medicines, pose
devastating health and safety risks. 58 For example, in 2007,
consumers were unwittingly putting antifreeze in their mouths
until Eduardo Arias, mentioned earlier, noticed a tube of
counterfeit toothpaste marked with the words “diethylene
glycol” (“DEG”). 59 In the past, counterfeiters have substituted
DEG as a cheap alternative for its more expensive chemical
54. Id.
55. John Schwartz, Black Market for Software is Sidestepping Export
Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/02/
business/technology-black-market-for-software-is-sidestepping-exportcontrols.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
56. See e.g., Goodwin, supra note 1, at 53 (Goodwin, recounting a situation
with one of her fashionable colleagues who experienced a rude awakening at a
cocktail party: “[My colleague] was nibbling on canapés, a designer bag in the
crook of her arm, when a publicist for the brand came over to chat and asked
her where she’d bought her handbag. My colleague had received it from her
boyfriend—a much-loved first-anniversary gift—and he’d found it online at a
great price. “That bag is a fake,” the publicist informed her. My colleague
asked her how she could tell and was shown the subtle difference in stitching—
almost invisible to the naked eye—that separated her handbag from the genuine
thing. She was mortified.”).
57. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21.
58. Id.
59. Bogdanich, supra note 5.
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counterpart, glycerin. 60
The tainted toothpaste was
manufactured in China, falsely labeled under Colgate and
Sensodyne brand names, and slipped into the international
Although the 2007 toothpaste scare in
marketplace. 61
Panama did not result in any consumer deaths in the United
States, 62 another drug the following year did.
In 2008, eighty-one people died from ingesting a
Chinese-made counterfeit version of the drug Heparin, 63 a
blood thinner commonly used prior to surgery 64 and often
prescribed to dialysis patients. 65 LeRoy Hubley, mentioned
earlier, watched his wife and son pass away from severe
allergic reactions brought on by a counterfeit version of the
drug—both used the blood thinners to regimen their
hereditary kidney disorder and were fatally poisoned by a
replicated version. 66 The Food and Drug Administration
identified Changzhou SPL, a Chinese subsidiary of Scientific
Protein Laboratories, 67 as the source of the adulterated blood
thinners, which substituted the use of genuine heparin with
oversulfated chondroitin sulfate—a contaminant estimated to
cost merely $9 per pound, as opposed to $900 per pound, the
cost of authentic heparin. 68 In light of these stark price
differences and the discovery that nearly one-third of the
material in some batches of heparin comprised of the cheaper
replacement led federal drug regulators to believe that the

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Editorial, The Frightening Heparin Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008 at A22,
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/28/opinion/28mon2.html?
pagewanted=print&_r=0; see also Olga Khazan, Here’s Why 10 Percent of the
Developing World’s Drugs Are Fake, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2012, 10:33 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/14/heres-why10-percent-of-the-developing-worlds-drugs-are-fake/.
64. News Release, U.S Food & Drug Admin., Baxter’s Multiple-Dose Vial
Heparin Linked to Severe Allergic Reactions (Feb. 11, 2008), http://
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2008/ucm116858.h
tm.
65. Heparin
Injections,
MEDLINE
PLUS,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682826.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (describing
the composition of heparin).
66. Harris, supra note 10.
67. Id. (Scientific Protein Laboratories supplied the contaminated heparin
material to Baxter International, which manufactured and delivered the finished
drug.).
68. Id.

available
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contamination was deliberate. 69 Though Chinese officials
have disputed the contention that the replacement chemical
caused death and injury, the circumstances were still enough
for FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach to
describe the contamination as a result of “economic fraud.” 70
Ultimately, the batches of blood-thinning drugs laced with
counterfeit active ingredients were shipped to eleven
countries and suspected in the deaths of eighty-one people. 71
Dangerous imitation drugs are not a recent discovery 72
and its development is far from elementary—to the contrary, it
operates within complex international frameworks. 73
Accordingly, Andrew Jackson, head of corporate security at
Novartis, describes the counterfeit drug trade as “not exactly
a mom-and-pop operation,” but rather as “organized crime.” 74
For example, by the time the adulterated drugs arrive in the
United States, the shipment has already traveled through
multiple countries. In one investigation, counterfeit drugs
produced in China were transported by road to Hong Kong,
sent by air to Dubai, and passed through London Heathrow
on the way to the counterfeit organization’s warehouse
fulfillment center in the Bahamas. 75 From there, the drugs
were shipped to another organization in the U.K., which then
ultimately delivered the packages to the United States.76
Since 2000, FDA inspections of counterfeit drugs have
increased by over 20% and consumer danger does not end
with purses, toiletries, and pharmaceuticals. 77 On many street
corners in some American cities, buyers can find counterfeit
golf clubs, eggs, 78 sneakers, auto parts, and infant formula. 79
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See e.g., Harris, supra note 10 (Heparin is made from the mucous
membranes of the intestines of slaughtered pigs that, in China, are often cooked
in unregulated family workshops. The FDA has identified 12 Chinese companies
that have supplied contaminated heparin to 11 countries—Australia, Canada,
China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand
and the United States).
72. Nastase, supra note 7.
73. Paul Toscano, The Dangerous World of Counterfeit Prescription Drugs,
USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
industries/health/drugs/story/2011-10-09/cnbc-drugs/50690880/1.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Nastase, supra note 7.
78. Patrick Boehler, Bad Eggs: Another Fake-Food Scandal Rocks China,
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3. Criminal Activity
i.

Terrorist Groups

Counterfeiting activity is also correlated with supporting
criminal activity both in China and the United States. 80
Spencer Burgess, director of Carratu International’s
Intellectual Property Investigations Division, warns against the
common misconception that counterfeiting is run by small
businesses attempting to make some extra income. 81 Rather,
counterfeiting is significantly more organized and malicious. 82
Links have been found between counterfeiting and Al-Qaeda,
Hezbollah, the Russian Mafia, and drug cartels. 83 Indeed, AlQaeda training materials exposed that part of their funding
was acquired through counterfeit goods. 84
Though purchasing faux Gucci sunglasses 85 or a pair of
fake Tory Burch shoes seems harmless enough, such small
purchases can serve as funding sources for international
terrorism because terrorist attacks do not require a significant
amount of money. 86 For example, the devastating 9/11
attacks are estimated to have cost only $500,000, 87 and the
1993 World Trade Center bombing only cost an estimated
$10,000. 88 In her statement to the U.S. Senate, Senator Susan
Collins explained that such a sum is effortlessly generated

TIME (Nov. 6 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/06/how-to-make-arotten-egg/.
79. Nastase, supra note 7; see also Hearing, supra note 24, at 5–6
(statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka) (Senator Akaka stressed that counterfeit goods
is not a victimless crime. Counterfeit baby formula sold in China resulted in the
deaths of 13 infants and serious illness to another 171 infants).
80. Hearing, supra note 24.
81. Rise in Counterfeit Market Linked To Terrorist Funding,
FRAUDAID,
http://www.fraudaid.com/scamspeak/conprods.htm
[hereinafter
Terrorist Funding].
82. Id.
83. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 28; see also Kevin Lewis, The Fake and the
Fatal: The Consequences of Counterfeits, 17 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 48, 52
(2009), available at http://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf.
84. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., TERRORIST
FINANCING STAFF MONOGRAPH 19, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch2.pdf; see also Terrorist Funding, supra
note 81.
85. Hardesty, supra note 29.
86. Nastase, supra note 7.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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from the sale of counterfeit goods. 89 Each day, investigators
find evidence strongly suggesting that terrorist groups are
raising funds through the sale of counterfeit goods. 90 As such,
a critical aspect in counter-terrorism efforts is to stifle such
funding sources that allow terror groups to operate. 91

ii. Child Labor
On the other side of purchasing counterfeit goods are the hands,
working for a pittance 92, which created the products. Over the years,
stories of the tragic lengths to which counterfeiting operators have gone
leaked out of China. 93 Though Shanghai and Beijing have rapidly
become the glittering cities of the future, where over 250,000 Chinese
“dollar millionaires” now live a life of luxury, the rural economy has
collapsed during China’s economic restructuring. 94 As a result, many
families in need of supplemental income are forced to send their
children to work in ramshackle factories, 95 the children’s labor fueling
the $600 billion per year counterfeiting industry. 96 Although children
under sixteen years of age are not legally allowed to work in China,
those laws are not always enforced. 97 Further shielding the public from
labor circumstances in China are regulations mandated in 2000 by the
Ministry of Labor classifying child-labor statistics as state secrets. 98
However, despite the local government’s effort to suppress what occurs
behind the closed doors of counterfeiting warehouses, tales of child
labor, often tantamount to slave labor, have nonetheless been
exposed. 99
89. Hearing, supra note 24, at 1–3 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff.).
90. Hearing, supra note 24, at 10–14 (testimony of Kris Buckner, President
of Investigative Consultants) (Investigate Consultants is a licensed private
investigative firm based in Southern California specializing in investigations
involving the manufacture, distribution, and sale of counterfeit goods).
91. Nastase, supra note 7, at 153.
92. Rising Slavery and Child Labor in China, ASIA BURNING,
http://www.asiaburning.com/entry/rising-slavery-and-child-labor-in-china/.
93. Corsi, supra note 4.
94. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 54.
95. Dana Thomas, The Fight Against Fakes, HARPER’S BAZAAR
(Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/magazine/feature-articles/thefight-against-fakes-0109.
96. About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL., available at
http://www.iacc.org/counterfeiting-statistics.html.
97. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 54.
98. Id.; see also Rising Slavery and Child Labor in China, ASIA BURNING,
available at http://www.asiaburning.com/entry/rising-slavery-and-child-labor-inchina/.
99. See e.g., Goodwin, supra note 1, at 54 (“The people who run factories
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II. ANALYSIS

A. Why Does Counterfeiting Occur?
1. History
History shows that Chinese counterfeiting is virtually as
old as America itself. 100 In 1784, the first American ship
traveled from New York to modern-day Guangzhou, returning
the following year with a cargo of tea, cotton fabric, and
porcelain that earned investors a 25% return. 101 American
ships began voyaging to Guangzhou, and the Chinese
craftsman they encountered were among the world’s most
talented and productive—and particularly skillful at
duplicating images. 102 In the early 1830s, the Carnes brothers
of New York City began sending French imports to
Guangzhou for Chinese craftsmen to replicate at a fraction of
the cost of an original. 103 Remarkable imitations began
flooding the French-crazed New York and were sold at
authentic prices, generating for the Carnes brothers a
spectacular return on their investment. 104 Today, Chinese
counterfeiting operates at a magnitude far greater than it did
centuries ago, 105 and an examination of China’s history
reveals the foundation of trademark counterfeiting. The
ongoing issue of counterfeiting in China needs to be analyzed
with an awareness of the country’s cultural roots and heritage
because a historical perspective of China will show how
deeply embedded the issue of counterfeiting is and will
proffer an explanation as to why enforcement has been
ineffective. 106
Historically, China has been characterized as a
collectivist society, where individualistic needs are
suppressed to enhance the harmony of the greater society. 107
are scumbags, hiring children, locking employees in production areas where
there have been fires and they can’t escape.”).
100. Eric Jay Dolin, Debate Jibes Ignore Chinese Counterfeiting’s Long
History, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/
2012/10/24/debate-jibes-ignore-chinese-counterfeitings-long-history/.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Hoover, supra note 15, at 343.
107. Edward Yui-tim Wong, The Chinese At Work: Collectivism or
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As a result, the concept of intellectual property rights conflicts
with long-established Chinese values. Deemed a moral code
by many, Confucianism served as a guide for proper Chinese
behavior from the sixth century B.C. to the middle of the
twentieth century, and Chinese imperial rules followed
Confucian beliefs to maintain their authority and
governmental regime. 108 Confucianism focused on the fluidity
and passing down of intellectual property for others to further
build on, encouraged imitation of teachers as a method of
learning, and emphasized subordination of individual interests
to benefit the greater societal good. 109 For the good of
society, work products were generated for and collectively
owned by the State, 110 not for the creator to individually gain
from. Consequently, asserting intellectual property rights by
excluding others is instinctively at odds with this communal
social order: new products ought to be invented and branded
not only for the individual creator’s own benefit but shared
with all members of the community as a whole. 111 In 1949, the
Chinese Communist Party emerged and furthered the
traditional collectivist mentality. 112 Therefore, historically, the
Chinese simply did not view intellectual property rights as an
individual right requiring protection—on the contrary, sharing
with others and copying from others were not only perfectly
acceptable ways of life, they were highly encouraged. 113
Furthermore, traditional Chinese culture places a heavy
emphasis on informal methods of social ordering such as
hierarchy and morality before turning to state laws. 114
Individualism?

H.K.
INST.
OF
BUS.
STUDIES
(Feb.
2001),
http://www.library.ln.edu.hk/eresources/etext/hkibs/hkws_0040.pdf.
108. Hoover, supra note 15, at 343 (citing Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic
Approach and East-Asian: From the Legal Culture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 13, 87 (2000)).
109. Hoover, supra note 15, at 343–44.
110. Id. at 344.
111. Id.
112. Dexin Tian, The Chinese Cultural Perceptions of Innovation, Fair Use,
and the Public Domain: A Grass-Roots Approach to Studying the U.S.-China
Copyright Disputes 50–51 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished dissertation, Bowling Green
State
University),
available
at
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/
document/get/bgsu1224963994/inline.
113. Hoover, supra note 15, at 344.
114. Aileen M. McGill, How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic

Trademarks and Why This Success May Not Generate Immediate Improvements
in Intellectual Property Protection in China, 9 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 6 (20092010).
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Confucianism disapproved of litigation, 115 considered
harmony with others a virtue, 116 and utilized external laws only
when self-regulation failed to provide an adequate remedy. 117
Believing in the rule of man rather than the rule of law, one of
Confucianism’s basic tenets states:
Lead the people with governmental measures and regulate
them by law and punishments, and they will avoid wrongdoing, but will have no sense of honor or shame. Lead
them by virtue and regulate them by the rules of propriety
and they will have a sense of shame, and moreover, set
themselves straight. 118

Therefore, the driving force behind morality and proper
behavior is the Chinese’s fear of shame and dishonor to the
country, 119 not reverence for legal regulations. Indeed, in
many trademark infringement cases, the penalty ordered by
the court is through shaming, 120 not a financial penalty: the
Chinese believe that such embarrassment should serve as an
adequate deterrent for future misbehavior. 121 Such penalties
show that a primary reason for China’s problems regarding
trademark infringement and legal enforcement is the
country’s long-cherished and deep-rooted culture. 122
Although over the past century China has undergone a
swift political and economic transformation, the cultural
mores and the laws of the country have consistently
preserved a Confucian and Marxist undertone of subjugating
individual interest for the greater good of society. 123 Many
people in China still believe that all creative works belong to
the society as a whole 124 and with such rich, long-standing
traditions, the high levels of counterfeiting occurring in China
115.
116.
117.
118.

Tian, supra note 112, at 52.

Id.

Hoover, supra note 15, at 344.
Hoover, supra note 15 at 344 citing William P. Alford, To Steal A Book is
an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 20
(STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997).
119. Hoover, supra note 15, at 345.
120. See e.g., id. (Public apologies are often the penalty required of an
infringer. If an infringer fails to apologize as ordered, the court may publish an
apology on their behalf).
121. Id. at 345.
122. Id. at 347.
123. McGill, supra note 114, at 6 citing Tao-Tai Hsia & Kathryn A. Huan, Laws
of the People’s Republic on Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 LAW & POL’Y
INT’L BUS. 743, 750 (1973).
124. Tian, supra note 112, at 53.
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today become unsurprising.

1. Local Protectionism and Governmental Corruption:
“The Sky is High and the Emperor is Far Away” 125
One reason why China participates so readily in
counterfeiting is because of local protectionism: since the
Chinese governmental structure is dominated by local—and
often corrupt—power, international treaties and laws are
difficult to enforce. 126 Despite acts of enforcement by the
local government, 127 another reason why counterfeiting is so
widespread is the lack of deterrence.
China’s chronic
underutilization of criminal punishment 128 is essentially the
equivalent of having no deterrence at all because the
infringers face very lenient penalties, particularly in
comparison to the profit they stand to gain per replicated
product. 129

i.

Lack of (True) Enforcement: Counterfeiting is Fuel
for the Chinese Economy

Although the central government, People’s Republic of
China (“PRC”), has made frequent declarations regarding the
importance of protecting intellectual property rights in
China, 130 actual enforcement occurs at the local level. 131 At
the ground level, pervasive issues of local protectionism and
other types of government corruption plague the possibility of
successful enforcement against counterfeiting 132 because of
125. Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of
Poisoned Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/

2007/05/06/world/americas/06poison.html?pagewanted=all. “The sky is high
and the emperor is far away” describes how the realities of provincial life are
distant from activities in Beijing. Id.
126. Hoover, supra note 15, at 341.
127. Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National
Companies in China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse,
41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 756 (2010) [hereinafter Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting
Strategies].
“Law enforcement officials wish to appease multi-national
companies [in combating counterfeiting], yet also do not wish to shut down the
counterfeiting trade.” Id.
128. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 SPECIAL 301REPORT 21, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf.
129. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127.
130. See CTR. GOV’T OF CHINA, Action Plan on IPR Protection for 2007 (Apr. 6,
2007), http://www.gov.cn/english/2007-04/06/content_574197.htm.
131. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 754.
132. Id.
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the direct and indirect interests the local government has in
letting the counterfeiting trade thrive. While U.S. companies
protest that they are losing billions of dollars from their
inventions being copied and sold in China, their losses
sustain the Chinese local economy. 133 Local government
officials are often unwilling to enforce trademark laws against
businesses because the companies generate sizeable
amounts of income for the government. 134 Some businesses
are so successful that their revenues single-handedly fuel the
entire local government 135 because clusters of legitimate
businesses (i.e. hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, and
warehouses) all depend on the counterfeit business. 136
Powerful local government officials are also infused into
management positions in various counterfeiting companies
because the presence of the government officials
demonstrates that the companies will be strongly defended
by local governments—and local governments in China
For
control all levels of power in law enforcement. 137
example, the local government elects the province’s judges,
police officers, and administrative enforcement officials. 138 If
these individuals choose to act contrary to the objectives of
the local government, they risk retaliatory action such as
being discharged from their jobs, demoted, or reduced
income. 139 The pressure of ceding to the wishes of local
government leaders repeatedly overrides the enforcement
officials’ desire to enforce laws against counterfeiters, 140
making true enforcement practically impossible.
Further adding to the local government’s unwillingness to
counter the counterfeiting trade is the fact that counterfeiting
provides much-needed jobs. 141 In fact, putting an end to
counterfeiting would mean loss of jobs, which augments a
government official’s inclination to turn a blind eye towards
133. Kristi Heim, Inside China’s Teeming World of Fake Goods,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006, 1:14 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/
businesstechnology/2002782434_chinapiracy12.html.
134. Hoover, supra note 15, at 341.
135. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 378 (2012).
An example of such a city is Yiwu. Id.
136. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 756.
137. Id. at 755.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 755.
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enforcing intellectual property laws 142 because PRC officials
fear unemployment the most—unemployment will cause
social turmoil, chaos, and unrest. 143 As attorney Nelson Dong
explains: “The government’s tacit winking of the eye is
because they know they are getting something from nonenforcement.” 144 Not only does the counterfeiting industry
help maintain social order, local governments receive a
substantial amount of taxes from sellers and distributors of
counterfeit goods. 145 The local government also receives
significant rent payments from the shop owners because
hundreds of tenants pay rent to a management company that
leases the land from the city. 146 For some locations, rent
reaches nearly $5,000 a month, 147 accruing for the local
government millions of dollars to use towards providing
essential public services. 148 In addition, local governments
are rewarded with subsidies if they meet economic targets set
by the national authorities. 149 Therefore, even though China’s
central government may be working towards reducing
counterfeiting, 150 the many incentives for local authorities’
non-compliance seriously hinder any progress towards
eradicating counterfeiting.
Ultimately, counterfeiting in China persists because
counterfeiting is a lucrative business and enforcement
authorities have no incentive to dismantle their local
economies by shutting down the activities. The number of
enforcement activities is in fact very high. 151 However, while
the enforcement activity is significant, nearly no punishment
results. 152 Therefore, the critical problem lies with deterrence.
Without adequate deterrence, counterfeiting continues.

ii. Lack of Deterrence
In order to effectively combat counterfeiting, focus needs
142. Heim, supra note 133.
143. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 756.
144. Heim, supra note 133.
145. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 755.
146. Heim, supra note 133.
147. Id.
148. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 755.
149. Id. at 756.
150. Heim, supra note 133.
151. Id. at 212.
152. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 212.
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to be placed on deterrence because without a severe penalty
resulting from enforcement activities, any amount of raids is
useless. There has been a marked increase in enforcement
activities 153 but the raids and seizures do not penalize enough
for an infringer to cease any wrongdoing because the fines
imposed on trademark infringers are far too low. 154 Penalties
for trademark infringement are calculated by the price of the
replicated good on the counterfeit market rather than by the
value of the original brand. Since the value of counterfeit
products is lower than the value of the original, fines are often
too small to outweigh the profits of engaging in the
counterfeiting trade. 155 Furthermore, only 1 in 489 cases are
criminally prosecuted, 156 and even then, infringers are
China’s high
generally only subjected to probation. 157
threshold for criminal prosecution of trademark infringement
fails to provide effective deterrence because infringers often
see these minor penalties as simply part of the ordinary
Therefore, China must not only
course of business. 158
heighten enforcement, but also increase counterfeiting
penalties as well in order to truly effectuate enforcement
activities. The following example of the 2008 Olympic Games
in Beijing provides a good model to pursue.
A central component as to why China was so successful
in thwarting counterfeiting activity surrounding the Olympic
Games was because of local government efforts: enforcement
mechanisms were improved and penalties were increased. 159
When China was awarded the Olympics in 2001, the country
responded by immediately passing legislation and
enforcement procedures for the protection of Olympic
trademarks. 160 The Beijing municipal government issued a
decree on the Protection of Olympic Intellectual Property
Provisions by the Beijing Municipality, the Beijing Organizing
153. Id.
154. Hoover, supra note 15, at 342. For example, the average penalty paid by
a counterfeiter in 2000 was $794. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial
Piracy Seriously, supra note 18, at 212.
155. Hoover, supra note 15, at 342.
156. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 212.
157. Nastase, supra note 7, at 154.
158. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 212.
159. McGill, supra note 114, at 21.
160. Id. at 23.
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Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (“BOCOG"),
which created a legal department assigned to protecting
Olympic intellectual property rights, and the national
government endorsed the Regulations on the Protection of
Olympic Insignia. 161 Interestingly enough, the text of the
Olympic trademark legislation was practically identical to
However, the
existing national trademark legislation. 162
differences between the two were the enforcement criteria
and increased penalties.
First, enforcement against counterfeiting was heightened
surrounding the Olympic Games by specifically delegating to
the Administration of Industry and Commerce the duty of
enforcing Olympic intellectual property violations. 163
Additionally, the BOCOG organized their own enforcement
staff dedicated to monitoring the market for incidences of
Olympic trademark infringement. 164 These actions by the
Chinese government sent a clear message regarding their
expectations of intellectual property rights and held local
government officials accountable when they failed to report
trademark infringement in favor of local interests. 165
Second, along with enhanced enforcement, penalties for
Olympic trademarks were determined from the Olympic item’s
official licensing fee rather than the arbitrary (and lower) price
of the infringing product. 166 Furthermore, fines could be
imposed even when no illegal income was earned. 167 Such
legislation offered a double layer of protection: by calculating
damages off of the more-expensive, genuine product rather
than the counterfeit price, penalties were higher and therefore
served as a greater disincentive. Then, the threat of fines
even when no illegal income was seized further deterred
potential infringers because the counterfeit trade becomes
fiscally undesirable; the infringer’s purpose of counterfeiting
essentially vanishes along with the disappearance of financial
incentives. Likewise, today, China should revise the penalties
for trademark infringement to align with those passed in the

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 24.
Id.
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Olympic regulations because counterfeiters are simply not
troubled by the low fines imposed upon them. 168 Determining
fines through the market price for the trademarked product
more appropriately compensates the market for the damage
done by infringement. 169 At the same time, the appeal of
counterfeiting diminishes if the financial losses outweigh the
gains. By heightening enforcement activities and increasing
penalties, China succeeded in protecting Olympic trademarks
and similarly, China ought to utilize the same mechanisms
towards eradicating counterfeiting altogether.
III. HOW TO END COUNTERFEITING

A. Education
One step towards eradicating counterfeiting in China
begins with a two-fold change in education: first, by instilling
in children from a young age about the importance of
protecting intellectual property rights in order to drive
innovation, and second, by changing the tone through which
such advice is administered. 170 Children must learn from an
early age the harm counterfeiting causes 171 because despite
China’s modern veneer, there still lays a deeply rooted
cultural factor at work. 172 From a young age, children in
schools have been taught to emulate artistic and literary
masters of the past, making the idea of intellectual property
simply foreign. 173 As David Zhang, vice president at a
Shanghai company, explains: “When [students] study, [they]
learn to copy the masters . . . if you say you want to be
innovative, people say you’re crazy . . . that’s a cultural
process, and it will take time to change.” 174 With such strong
cultural values, it will take nothing less than essentially
starting from scratch for China to eradicate counterfeiting.
China must educate from the ground up: Chinese children’s
mindsets must be transformed so they grow to learn about
the benefits of trademark protection rather than the negative,
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 25.
Id.
Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 776.
McGill, supra note 114, at 29.
Heim, supra note 133.
Id.
Id.
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visceral reaction the average Chinese citizen today feels
towards intellectual property. 175
In addition to educating children from a young age
regarding the importance of trademark protection, the U.S.
government must adopt a different approach in encouraging
China to take action against counterfeiting. Currently, and in
the past, most forms of “education” come in the form of the
U.S. government berating PRC officials to increase their
enforcement activities. 176 Officials from the United States
Trade Representative Office, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, and the United States Custom Service all
“educate” in the same manner: while a countless number of
speakers lecture on the importance of more enforcement
during training sessions, PRC officials sit back resentfully,
“becoming totally disinterested, bored, sickened and
hostile.” 177 As Professor Daniel K. Chow describes:
PRC officials have turned a deaf ear to the constant
haranguing and castigation by U.S. government officials.
This should not be surprising. No one likes to be
constantly lectured and pummeled for an endless list of
shortcomings . . . . If one mentions “intellectual property”
to the average person in China, the image that comes
immediately to mind is that of the U.S. government
lecturing in a condescending and arrogant fashion on the
need to protect U.S. intellectual property rights. 178

The mounting demands made by the U.S. result in
making the Chinese government and its officials more
defensive than receptive to strengthening its trademark
protection system, 179 and therefore, the U.S. government’s
method of education must change from a negative approach
to a positive approach. 180 If the U.S. government adopted a
less abrasive form of “education” towards the PRC officials in
urging their government to enforce trademark rights, and
Chinese children are taught from an early age the benefits
and importance of trademark protection, China can take
strides towards eliminating counterfeiting with time.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 776.
Id. at 775.

Id.
Id. at 776.
Hoover, supra note 15, at 347.
Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 776.
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B. Publicity
Aside from education, another way towards ending
counterfeiting is by exposing China’s activities to the public
because the consequential apprehension and sense of
national pride simultaneously increases China’s desire to
abide by fair practices and decreases their willingness to
accept misbehavior. Though government corruption is illegal
in China, it is tolerated so long as it remains shielded from the
Therefore, the key to curbing local
public eye. 181
protectionism—and ultimately, counterfeiting—is by raising
these issues with the PRC government and bringing them to
By exposing corruption, the
the public’s attention. 182
Communist Party becomes embarrassed and feels obligated
to act—and will generally do so promptly and mercilessly. 183
One example of such swift and effective action catalyzed
by publicity was China’s quick execution of Zheng Xiaoyu, a
former top drug and food regulator, exposed by the media to
have taken bribes to approve untested medicine. 184 Mr.
Zheng’s case served a political purpose because his
immediate and drastic punishment was the result of China
scrambling to prove that the PRC government was serious
about combating the country’s unimpressive product-safety
As a Chinese official explained about the
history. 185
uncommonly prompt execution: “Corruption in the food and
drug authority has brought shame to the nation. What we will
have to learn from the experience is to improve or work and
emphasize public safety.” 186 Since Mr. Zheng’s actions
embarrassed the country and threatened China’s reputation
abroad, government officials were compelled to—and did—
act quickly and severely in hopes of minimizing the damage
done.
Another example of quick government action prompted
by publicity was China’s response to the Falun Gong, a
pervasive social movement that was perceived to threaten the
181. Id. at 778.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Joseph Kahn, China Quick to Execute Drug Official, N.Y. TIMES
(July 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/business/worldbusiness/
11execute.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1355356922SJdjAEwNS5qztp3yIuXYMw.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Communist Party’s power and authority. 187 Even though the
movement involved millions of people throughout China, the
government was able to completely eliminate the movement
because they were under the pressure of severe international
Therefore, despite China’s considerable
criticism. 188
geographical size and diversity, 189 the government is capable
of controlling even such widespread behavior—when the
world is watching. Accordingly, the same effect should be
within the government’s power to effectuate in the realm of
counterfeiting.
In 2008, the Olympics in Beijing did just that: the Games
put China in the spotlight, magnifying their achievements—
and shortcomings—in the field of intellectual property
enforcement. 190 Under such critical observation of the world,
China underwent tremendous “packaging,” 191 civility
campaigns, and true enforcement activity in order to present
China’s best foot forward. 192 Global public relations firms
were hired, campaigns to improve manners and foster new
attitudes were initiated, celebrities and the media’s
assistance were solicited, and perhaps most importantly,
local efforts were significantly strengthened. 193 Counterfeiting
did still occur, 194 but fake Olympic merchandise appeared less
187. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 222.
188. Id.
189. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000)
(describing how China’s size and diversity have impeded the enforcement of
national laws).
190. McGill, supra note 114, at 28.
191. IR2008: Packaging China for the Olympics, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM,
2007, at 123, available at http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/
CRF.1.2007/CRF-2007-1__complete.pdf.
“Packaging” refers to the efforts
expended towards improving China’s image and preparing the country for
international eyes. Major “packaging” participants include global public
relations companies, legal services, advertising firms, and so on. Id.
192. Calum MacLeod, China Wants Olympians to See Its Best Behavior, USA
TODAY (Feb. 8, 2006, 9:32 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/
2006-02-08-china-manners_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA.
193. Id.
194. See e.g., Hamish McKenzie, Faking It: Piracy Poses Headache for
Olympics,
CNN,
July
31,
2007,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/07/24/
olympics.piracy/index.html?iref=newssearch. (Chinese authorities uncovered
over 1,500 cases of violations involving Beijing Olympic slogans, logos, and
other trademarks between 2004 and 2005, resulting in fake goods worth $1.9
million. However, these cases resulted in fines of nearly $1.1 million.).

CHANG FINAL

2014]

8/21/2014 4:08 PM

TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING

789

frequently than one would imagine, even in markets normally
filled with counterfeit designer goods. 195 With their national
pride at stake and heightened deterrence mechanisms, the
Chinese felt a greater unwillingness to profit from Olympic
symbols because bringing pride and honor to China remained
of utmost importance. 196
Therefore, using Mr. Zheng’s execution, Falun Gong, and
the Olympics as examples, one way China can end
counterfeiting is through mobilizing its people and instilling a
sense of national pride and responsibility towards achieving a
common goal: when their “face” is on the line, 197 China is
more apt to properly comply. As Zhang Huigang, director of
Beijing’s Capital Ethics Development Office explains: “We
want foreign guests to see the good side of Beijing . . . we
want to give foreign guests a good impression.” 198 Such
publicity and its corresponding national pride, coupled with
the government participation in truly enforcing against
counterfeiting activity through deterrence and fear, 199 can
serve as a mighty force towards gradually eradicating the
counterfeiting trade in China.

C. Long-Term Approach
Although revamping education and increasing publicity
can contribute greatly towards ending the counterfeit trade, it
must be acknowledged that any serious change in
counterfeiting activity will be the result of long-term efforts
rather than short-term. 200 Local governmental authorities are
unlikely to take significant action on their own initiative
because of the financial support counterfeiting infuses to
local economies. 201 Consequently, local governments must
195. McGill, supra note 114, at 21.
196. Id. at 20.
197. McKenzie, supra note 194 (James McGregor, CEO of China research and
advisory firm JL McGregor and Company, explained about the Olympics: “It’s
international. It’s China’s coming-out party. It’s China’s face. Who wants to
put on the Olympics and be looked at as the low-class pirate country that steals
everyone else’s trademarks?”).
198. Id. (Zhang concedes that the goal is difficult.).
199. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 222 (explaining how China utilized draconian measures to eradicate the
Falun Gong).
200. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 773.
201. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note
18, at 222.
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be pressured by Beijing to instigate a serious crackdown. 202
However, the government is in no hurry to undertake such a
crackdown because of the disastrous domino effect that
results: local economics will be crippled, tax revenues for
cities will be diminished, and local business that support
counterfeit goods will be disturbed. 203 Therefore, in light of
the significant costs, China’s leaders have no compelling
reason to take on the counterfeit crisis. 204 China and its
willingness to abide by guidelines is a matter of political will—
and since the political will to change does not currently exist,
any significant improvement will require perhaps even
decades. 205 As Zhang, mentioned earlier, explains: “Building
stadiums is no problem . . . but raising people’s quality and
civilization is not something we can do in one or two months,
or even one or two years.” 206
CONCLUSION
Counterfeiting in China is particularly attractive because
the penalties and risks of getting caught are very low while its
money-generating potential is incredibly high. 207 Effectively
enforcing trademark law in a country whose deep cultural
background is at odds with intellectual property rights will be
a timely and ongoing challenge, 208 especially with few
incentives to counter the trade and a lack of political will.
However, increasing penalties for trademark infringement will
more successfully deter counterfeiting, as will education from
an early age regarding the importance of protecting
intellectual property rights and increased publicity to shed
light upon the counterfeiting crisis in China. And in doing so,
perhaps incidences of tragedies suffered by Wang Yajuan and
the Hubleys will with time fade away.
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